For differential games of fixed duration of linear dynamical systems with nonquadratic payoff functionals, it is proved that the value and the optimal strategies as saddle point exist whenever the associated pseudo-Riccati equation has a regular solution P (t, x). Then the closed-loop optimal strategies are given by
Introduction
The theory of differential games has been developed for several decades. The early results of differential games of a fixed duration can be found in [2, 3, 5] , and the references therein. For linear-quadratic differential and integral games of distributed systems, the closed-loop syntheses have been established in various ways and cases in [6, 8, 10] , and most generally in terms of causal synthesis [12, 14] .
In another relevant arena, the synthesis results for nonquadratic optimal control problems of linear dynamical systems have been obtained in [11, 13] , and some of the references therein. The key issue is how to find and implement nonlinear closed-loop optimal controls with nonquadratic criteria, which have been solved with the aid of a quasi-Riccati equation.
In this paper, we investigate nonquadratic differential games of a finite-dimensional linear system, with a remark that the generalization of the obtained results to infinite-dimensional distributed systems has no essential difficulty.
differential game problem has a value and whether a saddle point of optimal strategies exists and can be found in terms of an explicit state feedback.
Since the players' sets of choices are not compact for such a differential game of fixed duration and (unlike the quadratic optimal control problems) its payoff functional has no convexity or concavity in general, the existences of a value, a saddle point, and most importantly a feedback implementation of optimal strategies in a constructive manner for this type of games are still open issues. We will tackle these issues with a new idea of pseudo-Riccati equation.
Let T > 0 be finite and fixed. Consider a linear system of differential equations:
where the state function x(t) and initial data x 0 take values in R n , u(t) as the control of the player (I) takes value in R m and governed by a strategy (which is denoted simply by u), and v(t) as the control of the player (II) takes value in R k and governed by a strategy (which is denoted simply by v). The inner products in R n , R m , and R k will be denoted by ·, · , which will be clear in the context. All the concepts and results in nonlinear analysis used in this paper, such as gradient operator and proper mapping, can be found in [1, 9] .
Pseudo-Riccati equations
To study the solvability of the nonquadratic differential game problem described by (1.1), (1.2) , and (1.3), we consider the following pseudo-Riccati equation associated with the game problem:
P t (t, x)+P x (t, x)Ax + A * P(t, x)
− P x (t, x) BR
with the terminal condition
The unknown of the pseudo-Riccati equation is a nonlinear mapping P(t, x) : [0,T] × R n → R n . We use P t and P x to denote the partial derivatives of P with respect to t and x, respectively. This pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1) with determining condition (2.2) will be denoted by (PRE).
is called a regular solution of the (PRE) if P satisfies the following conditions:
is continuous in (t, x) and continuously differentiable, respectively, in t and in x, and P satisfies (2.1) and condition (2.2); (ii) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(t, ·) : R n → R n is a gradient operator; (iii) the initial value problem
has a unique global solution x ∈ X c for any given x 0 ∈ R n .
Syntheses of differential games and pseudo-Riccati equations
Suppose P is a regular solution of the (PRE). According to the definition of gradient operators (cf. [1] ), for any t ∈ [0,T] there exist anti-derivatives Φ(t, x) of P(t, x), which are nonlinear functionals
Since anti-derivatives may be different only up to a constant, we can set the following condition to fix the constant: Proof. From the expression of any state trajectory,
. From (1.5), (2.4), and (2.5) it follows that
Let Ω be a closed and convex set defined by
where x is a trajectory as above. According to Definition 2.1, P(t, x), P t (t, x), and P x (t, x) are all uniformly bounded in their norms over the convex, compact set [0,T]×Ω. By the mean value theorem, it follows that P(t, x) satisfies the uniform Lipschitz condition with respect to (t,
by the following straightforward estimation based on (2.7): Then using the integration by parts to treat the term at the end of (2.11), we have (2.12) and by (1.5) the inner integral in the last term of (2.12) can be rewritten as follows:
Substituting (2.12) with (2.13) into (2.11), we obtain
sx(t) ,x(t) ds
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Therefore, (2.10) is satisfied for a.e. t ∈ [0,T].
Closed-loop optimal strategies
Under the assumption that there is a regular solution of the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1), (2.2), we can show the existence, uniqueness, and closed-loop expressions of a pair of optimal strategies as well as the existence of the value of this differential game. It is one of the main results of this work.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that there exists a regular solution P(t, x) of the (PRE).
Then, for any given x 0 ∈ R n , the differential game described by (1.1), (1.2) , and (1.3) has a value and a unique pair of optimal strategies in the saddle-point sense.
Moreover, the optimal strategies are given by the following closed-loop expressions,
where x stands for the corresponding state trajectory of (1.1).
Proof. Let Φ(t, x) be the anti-derivative of P(t, x) such that (2.5) is satisfied. For any given x 0 and any admissible strategies {u, v}, from Lemma 2.3 we have
Sv(t),v(t) + Bu(t)+Cv(t),P t, x(t)
Let β(t, x) be the function defined by
Then we have ∂β ∂x
From (3.2) and (3.4), we can get
+ 1 0 ∂β ∂x t,
sx(t) ,x(t) ds
Now integrating the expressions at the two ends of equality (3.
is an absolutely continuous function, we end up with Note that (2.2) and (2.
Then, with (3.7) substituted, (3.6) can be written as
where
Note that (3.8) holds for any admissible strategies {u, v}. According to Definition 2.1, the initial value problem (2.3) has a global solution x(·) ∈ X c over [0,T]. Hence, the strategies given by the state feedback expressions in (3.1) are admissible strategies. And (3.8) shows that
which depends on x 0 and T only. For any other admissible strategies {u, v}, (3.8) implies
since R is positive definite and S is negative definite. This proves that there exists a unique pair of optimal strategies {û,v}, given by (3.1), and that the value of this game exists. In fact, the value is 
in the derivation of (3.11).
Mayer problem: solution to the pseudo-Riccati equation
In this section, we assume that Q(x) ≡ 0. Then the payoff functional reduces to
This type of differential games described by (1.1), (4.1), and (1.3) can be referred to as the Mayer problem, according to its counterpart in optimal control theory and in calculus of variations. Since a general problem (1.1), (1.2) can be reduced to a Mayer problem by augmenting the state variable with additional one dimension, it is without loss of generality to consider Mayer problems only. Associated with this Mayer problem, we will consider a nonlinear algebraic equation with one parameter τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ T, as follows:
Here, (4.2) has an unknown y ∈ R n and a parameter τ ∈ [0,T]. Equation (4.2) can also be written as
with
However, unlike the optimal control problems, here G(t) is in general neither nonnegative, nor nonpositive due to the assumptions on R and S.
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First consider a family of differential games defined over a time interval [τ, T] , where 0 ≤ τ ≤ T is arbitrarily fixed. We use (DGP) τ to denote the differential game problem for the linear system
with respect to the payoff functional
in the sense of saddle point, that is,
where A, B, C, M, R, and S satisfy the same assumptions made in Section 1.
We first investigate the solution of (4.2) and then find out its connection to a regular solution of the pseudo-Riccati equation (PRE). The entire process will go through several lemmas as follows. Proof. Suppose that {û,v} is a pair of saddle-point strategies with respect to (DGP) τ . Then one has
In other words,û is the minimizer of J τ (x 0 ,u,v) subject to constraint (4.5) with v =v, andv is the maximizer of J τ (x 0 ,û, v) subject to constraint (4.5) with u = u. Thus one can apply the Pontryagin maximum principle (cf. [7] ). Since the Hamiltonians in these two cases are, respectively,
the co-state function ϕ associated with the optimal controlû in (4.8) satisfies the following terminal value problem:
72 Syntheses of differential games and pseudo-Riccati equations and the co-state function ψ associated with the optimal controlv in (4.9) satisfies the same terminal value problem (4.11), with the same value x(T) that corresponds to the control functions {û,v}. Therefore, one has
By the maximum principle, the saddle-point strategies can be expressed as the following functions of the time variable t:
Hence the state trajectory x corresponding to the saddle-point strategies {û,v} satisfies the following equation, for t ∈ [τ, T],
(4.14)
Let t = T in (4.14) and change variable in the integral by renaming T − τ − s as s.
Then we obtain
Equation (4.15) shows that, since x 0 ∈ R n is arbitrary, for any given x = x 0 ∈ R n on the right-hand side of (4.2), there exists a solution y to (4.2), which is given by It is, however, quite difficult to address the issue of the uniqueness of solutions to (4.2). Now we will exploit a homotopy-type result in nonlinear analysis for this purpose, based on a reasonable assumption below. For each τ ∈ [0,T], define a mapping K τ : R n → R n by
where G(·) is given by (4.3). Actually, K τ (y) is the left-hand side of (4.2). Also let K(y, τ) = K τ (y). We make another assumption here. Using the above two lemmas, we can study the uniqueness of solutions of (4.2) and the properties of the solution mapping based on the aforementioned assumptions.
Lemma 4.6. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3, for every
Proof. We will check all the conditions in Lemma 4.4 and then apply that lemma to this case by setting Therefore, we apply Lemma 4.4 to conclude that for every τ ∈ [0,T], the mapping K τ is a homeomorphism on R n . Finally, since M is analytic, it is clear that the mapping K τ is a C 1 mapping. It remains to show that K −1 τ is also a C 1 mapping. Indeed, due to (4.16) and the uniqueness of the solution to (4.2) just shown by the homeomorphism, we can assert that
where x(t), τ ≤ t ≤ T, satisfies (4.14) or equivalently {x, ϕ} satisfies the following differential equations and the initial-terminal conditions: τ is a C −1 mapping. Thus, we have proved K τ is a C 1 diffeomorphism on R n . 
is a nonsingular matrix.
The inverse matrix of (4.21) will be denoted by [I + G(T − τ)M (y)] −1 . Corollary 4.7 is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.6 and the chain rule (cf. [1] or [9] ). Thanks to Lemma 4.6 and the linear homeomorphism e −A(T−τ) , there exists a unique solution y of (4.2) for any given τ ∈ [0,T] and any given x ∈ R n .
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This solution y can be written as a mapping H(T −·, ·) : [0,T]×R n → R n , namely,
This mapping H will be referred to as the solution mapping of (4.2). We are going to show the properties of the nonlinear mapping H, which will be used later in proving the main theorem of this section. Proof. Define a mapping
Obviously, E is C 1 mapping and E y = DK τ (y) is invertibly due to Corollary 4.7, for any τ and y. Note that (4.2) is exactly E(t, y, x) = 0. Then by the implicit function theorem and its corollary (cf.
[1]), the solution mapping H(T − t, x) of (4.2) (renaming τ = t) is a C 1 mapping with respect to (t, x). Its partial derivatives are given by
Directly calculating E t and E x from (4.25) and (4.3) and then substituting them into (4.26) and (4.27), we obtain (4.23) and (4.24).
Before presenting the main result of this section, we need a lemma which provides some properties of the inverses of some specific types of operators. These properties will be used to prove the self-adjointness of concerned operators in the main result. 
C is boundedly invertible and its inverse operator is given by
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is also boundedly invertible and the following equality holds:
Proof. The proof is similar to the matrix case, so it is omitted.
Now we can present and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.10. Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3, there exists a regular solution P(t, x) of the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1) with the terminal condition (2.2). This regular solution is given by
and H(T − t, x) is the solution mapping of (4.2) defined in (4.22).
Proof. It is easy to verify that the terminal condition (2.2) is satisfied by this P(t, x) because
Step 1. It is clear that P(t, x) defined by (4.30) is continuous in (t, x) and, due to Lemma 4.8, P(t, x) is continuously differentiable in t and in x, respectively. Now we show that this P satisfies the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1). In fact, by (4.23) and (4.24) and using the chain rule, we can get
From (4.23), (4.24), (4.32), and (4.33), it follows that 
Applying Lemma 4.9(b) to this case with
is also boundedly invertible. In order to show that P x (t, x) in (4.35) is selfadjoint, it is enough to show that
where the last equality follows from Lemma 4.9(b) and (4.29). Hence, P x (t, x) is selfadjoint and, consequently, P(t, ·) is a gradient operator for every t ∈ [0,T].
Step 3. Finally we show the existence of a global solution x(·) ∈ X c to the initial value problem (2.3) over [0,T], for any given x 0 ∈ R n . Indeed, by Lemma 4.2, there exists a trajectory x(·) ∈ X c corresponding to a saddle-point pair of strategies of (DGP) τ=0 with any given initial state x 0 . Then by (4.14), the terminal value of this trajectory satisfies
which is equivalent to (4.39) and that in turn implies x(T) is a solution to (4.2) with the right-hand side being e A(T−t) x(t). By the uniqueness of (4.2) shown in Lemma 4.6, we have 
x(T)+G(T − t)M x(T) = e A(T−t) x(t),
has a unique global solution x ∈ X c for any given x 0 ∈ R n , where
defined by (4.22 
) is the solution mapping of (4.2). Then there exists a regular solution P(t, x) of the pseudo-Riccati equation (2.1) with the terminal condition (2.2). This regular solution is given by
Proof. By condition (a) and the implicit function theorem, (4.2) has a unique solution for every τ and x so that the solution mapping H(T − τ, x) in (4.22) is well defined. Note that Lemma 4.8 depends on the invertibility of I + G(T − τ)M (y) only, and Lemma 4.9 is independent. Therefore, Steps 1 and 2 in the proof of Theorem 4.10 remain valid since they depend only on Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9. Since Step 3 is entirely covered by condition (b) in this corollary, we have the same conclusion as in Theorem 4.10.
In an example of one-dimensional differential equation we will present in Section 5, the two conditions in Corollary 4.11 can be verified. 
Summary and example
In this paper, we present a new method to study the synthesis issue of nonquadratic differential games of linear dynamical systems. The new idea is by the pseudo-Riccati equations approach. In this direction, we have proved two results.
The first result is Theorem 3.1. It states that under very general conditions, as long as there exists a regular solution of the (PRE), then the differential game has a unique pair of optimal strategies in the saddle-point sense and the optimal strategies can be expressed explicitly as real-time state feedbacks given in (3.1). Regarding this result, we have the following remarks.
(i) This result is a substantial generalization of the synthesis of nonquadratic optimal control via the quasi-Riccati equations (cf. [11, 13] ).
(ii) This result can be potentially generalized to nonquadratic differential games of infinite-dimensional linear dynamical systems. It can also be generalized to the nonautonomous cases.
(iii) Since the Hamilton-Jacobi equations are related to the synthesis of optimal control problems and the Issac equations are related to the synthesis of differential game problems, the relationship between the pseudo-Riccati equations and these two equations is to be explored.
The second result is Theorem 4.10 which is valid for Mayer problems. It states that under two assumptions, which are reasonable though, there exists a regular solution of the pseudo-Riccati equation and its solution can be explicitly expressed as (4.30) in terms of the solution mapping of a parametrized, nonlinear algebraic equation (4.2) . Therefore, the syntheses of the Mayer problems have been solved. Certainly Corollary 4.11 provides a (short-cut) alternative result with two different assumptions. Here we have two more remarks.
(iv) The proof of Theorem 4.10 involves substantial difficulties in comparison with the counterpart result associated with nonquadratic optimal control problems (cf. [11, 13] ). In the optimal control cases since M is assumed to be convex so that M (y) is always nonnegative and CS −1 C * = 0 so that G(t) in (4.3) is always nonnegative too, one can easily claim that DK τ (y) = I +G(T − τ)M (y) is nonsingular and its inverse has an explicit expression: However, the above equality does not hold in the case of differential games, because none of M (y) and G(t) can be assumed nonnegative. This difficulty is overcome by using a homotopy lemma due to Caccioppoli, Lemma 4.4, and showing the mapping K τ is C 1 diffeomorphism directly.
(v) One can investigate different solution concepts of the pseudo-Riccati equations, such as the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions. But we did not address this issue since we do not need it for the main results.
Finally, we provide an example to illustrate the synthesis of a Mayer problem of nonquadratic differential game by using the results of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 4.11 in this paper. 
